April 2005
Featured Disciplinary Case
Topic
A pattern and practice of excessive and duplicative litigation can violate the ethics rule providing that lawyers shall make reasonable effort to expedite litigation.
Summary
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against, Ronald A. Arthur, 2005 WI 40 (Wisconsin, April 15, 2005). The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked Arthur’s license and ordered him to pay all of the costs connected with the disciplinary proceeding, $145,548.73. Arthur, who was licensed 1982, filed a multitude of lawsuits in five different counties arising out of his dispute with former clients named the Keefes. Mr. Keefe retained Arthur to represent him in several small legal matters in the early 1990s. By early 1994, while owing a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to his clients, Keefe and Arthur discussed a possible business arrangement whereby Arthur would purchase parcels of wooded land and a corporation owned by the Keefes would harvest the marketable timber and pay Arthur a higher price for the timber than other loggers would pay. Thereafter, Arthur purchased four parcels of land in southwestern Wisconsin and entered into four separate logging contracts relating to the Keefe’s harvesting operations. Logging commenced, but was apparently slow. The relationship between the lawyer and his clients deteriorated. Arthur alleged that the Keefes did not pay him for harvested timber and that he lost some $50,000 as a result. The Keefes claimed that they felt threatened by their lawyer and were convinced that Arthur was involved in an illegal Russian money laundering scheme. The Keefes wanted Arthur to restructure the logging agreements. Instead, Arthur sent them a letter offering to purchase their interests in the deal and advising the clients that they should seek independent legal counsel or sign a conflicts waiver. The Keefes refused. They then removed hundreds of felled logs from one of Arthur’s properties. As a result of this action, the lawsuits began piling up like cordwood. Arthur aggressively dealt with opponents and perceived enemies alike. In one action filed in Dodge County against his the Keefes, Arthur informed the their lawyer that his wife, Mary Arthur, was a “former district attorney for Dodge County.” In another matter, one of Arthur’s neighbors complained to him about a logging road that had been cut across the corner of her property without her permission. She felt the aesthetic damage to her property was significant. In response to her concerns, Arthur wrote the neighbor’s lawyer and warned that the neighbor might, “find the litigation process unpleasant.” His conduct concerning the logging dilemma does not appear to be isolated. A referee found that he engaged in a decade long pattern of suing opposing counsel and judges. Eventually, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) charged Arthur with various acts of wrongdoing including entering into a prohibited business transaction with clients and making false statements to a tribunal. The most novel allegation was that Arthur had violated SCR 20:3.2. Rule 20:3.2 is modeled upon ABA Model Rule 3.2 and provides that, “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” The rule, found in most jurisdictions, is typically used when Bar Counsel alleges that a lawyer has been neglectful. Here, however, OLR argued that Arthur’s duplicative and excessive history of litigation could also violate the provision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that there was little case law directly supporting such an interpretation, yet nevertheless found that Arthur had violated the rule. In support, the Court looked to the rule comments:
Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.
