October 2007
Featured Disciplinary Case
Topic
In order to mitigate a disciplinary sanction, a lawyer who has a diagnosed mental disorder must provide competent proof that the disabling symptoms are fully managed.
Summary
George M. Parker served as a judge of the Mason Municipal Court in Ohio. He was found to have committed numerous improper and injudicious acts as a judge that violated both the judicial ethics code and lawyer professional responsibility provisions. He argued that any sanction imposed against him had to be tempered due to his diagnosed narcissistic personality disorder. He also attributed his disciplinary difficulties to political disputes that he had with other municipal officials such as the Mason City Police Chief, Law Director, Prosecuting Attorney, and City Council. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the Disciplinary Counsel's investigation had raised legitimate concerns about his fitness, most of which had no connection to any underlying political tension. His misconduct was varied and oftentimes bizarre:
- A woman was in court to watch her daughter's probation-violation hearing. She sat in the gallery as Parker lectured her daughter from the bench about drug abuse. The woman raised her hand, and Parker trained his attention on her and told the woman to leave. When she protested slightly, he told her to "just leave" and that he had "heard enough" out of her. He then threatened to put her in jail "in [her] daughter's place" if she did not "[j]ust get up and leave." The woman started to leave the courtroom, muttering, "I can't believe this," but Parker called her back and immediately found her in contempt of court. He sentenced her to 24 hours in jail and officers took her away in handcuffs;
- He accepted a defendant's guilty plea and passed sentence even though he had been present for the defendant's arrest. The month before, he signed a search warrant for the defendant's apartment and accompanied the police when they executed the warrant in an early morning raid. He saw the defendant as officers put him in handcuffs, and the police confirmed that they had confiscated stolen property from his apartment. He rode with an officer to the County Jail and signed the defendant's commitment order;
- A defendant had been left in jail, apparently by order of the Mason Police Chief over a dispute with the Sheriff over whose duty it was to transport inmates. The prosecutor and defense counsel heatedly debated the problem in Parker's chambers. Parker decided to dial 911, apparently because it was after normal business hours and he thought no one at the police station would answer any other line. He advised the dispatcher that the call was not an emergency and asked for a police officer to report to his chambers. Parker then ordered the responding officer to transport the defendant, but the officer refused, saying that he could not disobey the Police Chief. Several days later, a newspaper article detailed Parker's use of the 911 emergency response system. To fend off any criticism or charges of wrongdoing, Parker called defense counsel at home and asked for a written account of the incident, suggesting that the account adhere to Parker's recollection of the incident. Neither the defense counsel nor the prosecutor agreed with Parker's exculpatory version of what happened that day in his chambers. Parker later offered varying and inconsistent stories, including the categorically false explanation that he called 911 at the prosecutor's direction and the preposterous claim that he called 911 to make a record of the in-chambers discussion, knowing that 911 calls are recorded.
- In two different cases, predetermined an outcome and then actively worked to produce that outcome;
- Persisted in having a domestic violence victim's picture taken even after the prosecutor offered the defendant a plea to a misdemeanor for disorderly conduct;
- Asked a teenage defendant, who was Jewish, why he was attending a Catholic high school;
- Forced defendants accused of alcohol-related offenses to admit in open court that they were alcoholics;
- Ordered alcohol-related offenders to pull out and throw away imaginary car keys or to pretend to put an imaginary alcohol demon in a headlock.
- Refused during trial to return the walking cane of a defendant who had been accused of using the cane to damage a vehicle. The defendant had to ask for assistance from his counsel to leave the witness box and return to counsel table. Parker also characterized the defendant on the record as a "frequent flyer" familiar with court proceedings and as "snake-bit mean."
- Insisted on learning from a victim of domestic violence whether she "forgave" the defendant, her husband. Parker delayed sentencing in the case to pressure the victim into answering this intrusive question despite her reluctance and fear of reprisal from her husband or the court. In the end, the victim could truthfully say only that she was "working on" forgiving her husband and left the courtroom distraught; and
- Presided over a hearing in which a woman had been charged with marijuana use in violation of her probation. The woman pleaded no contest to the violation in open court. Parker obtained from the woman the name of the man who allegedly sold her the marijuana and had his clerk call the man during the hearing. Parker put the call on his speakerphone, and the courtroom heard their conversation, including:
Parker: "Hi, is this Chad? Hi, is this-Hi is this Chad?"
Voice: "Yes it is."
Parker: "Uh Chad, this is somebody who understands you're selling drugs to people. Uh, Chad, they're gonna getcha buddy. Stop selling drugs if you are. If not, sorry about the call. Have a good day."
An independent certified forensic psychiatrist testified that Parker has narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), a condition that undoubtedly contributed to his misconduct. As the expert explained, a personality disorder is a group of personality traits that consistently present functional impairment or distress. NPD sufferers exhibit a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, have a need for admiration, and lack empathy. According to the expert, because persons with NPD have grandiose self-esteem, they are vulnerable to intense reactions when their self-image is damaged. They respond with strong feelings of hurt or anger to even small slights, rejections, defeats, or criticisms. As a result, NPD sufferers usually go to great lengths to avoid exposure to such experiences and, when that fails, react by becoming devaluative or rageful. The psychiatrist offered no statistics on the success rate for treatment of NPD, explaining that "the vast majority of people who have this condition don't ever go into treatment because they don't think they have a problem by definition…the problem is outside of themselves." NPD is not a mental illness, but it is a disorder that may present ongoing vulnerabilities in a lawyer's ability to consistently practice in a safe and responsible manner. Importantly in this case, the expert's examination and diagnosis did not permit him to conclude to a reasonable degree of medical certainty either that Parker had experienced a sustained period of successful treatment and could, or would, be able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. NPD is not, however, readily amenable to treatment. The expert believed that Parker could improve with treatment because he was capable of constructive behavioral modifications, but as of the time of his report and testimony, the psychiatrist could not register a medical opinion that Parker's condition had improved to the extent that he no longer posed a risk to the public as a practitioner or judge. In reviewing the psychiatric evidence, the Court ruled:
We have never allowed a lawyer who has committed misconduct because of a mental disability to continue to practice without the assurance of a qualified health-care professional...that the lawyer is able to practice safely. Evidence suggesting that the lawyer may be able to practice competently and in accordance with ethical and professional standards is not nearly enough. Our cases show that a lawyer whose diagnosed mental disability has contributed to his misconduct must provide competent proof that the disabling symptoms are fully managed currently.
Parker was suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months, stayed after one year by conditions. He was concurrently suspended, without pay, from his judicial office. The stay will only go in effect if certain conditions are met, including Parker's participation in psychotherapy with a qualified health-care professional and a health-care professional's certification that he is able to practice law in a competent, ethical, and professional manner,
Disciplinary Counsel v. George M. Parker, 116 Ohio St. 3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635 (Ohio October 25, 2007).
